Immunity or Impunity?  The Potential Effect of Prosecutions of State Officials for Core International Crimes in States Like the United States That Are Not Parties to the Statute of the International Criminal Court by Summers, Mark A.
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 31 | Issue 2 Article 3
2006
Immunity or Impunity? The Potential Effect of
Prosecutions of State Officials for Core
International Crimes in States Like the United
States That Are Not Parties to the Statute of the
International Criminal Court
Mark A. Summers
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Mark A. Summers, Immunity or Impunity? The Potential Effect of Prosecutions of State Officials for Core International Crimes in States Like
the United States That Are Not Parties to the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 31 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2006).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol31/iss2/3
IMMUNITY OR IMPUNITY?  
THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF 
PROSECUTIONS OF STATE OFFICIALS FOR 
CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN STATES 
LIKE THE UNITED STATES THAT ARE NOT 
PARTIES TO THE STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
Mark A. Summers* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ugo Grotius, often called the father of international law,1 would 
be shocked to learn that in the 21st century the international 
community asserts the right to prosecute state officials for international 
crimes. Only since World War II has international law expanded to im-
pose individual criminal responsibility on state officials.2 A series of in-
ternational criminal law conventions has been adopted which obligates 
states to extradite or prosecute international criminals found within their 
territories, regardless of where the crimes were committed.3 International 
tribunals have been created to deal with the most heinous crimes and the 
most prominent wrongdoers, while national tribunals, which are left to 
prosecute the lesser malefactors, remain an integral part of this develop-
ing system of international criminal law enforcement.4 
This substantial progress notwithstanding, few convictions of interna-
tional criminals would have been possible if traditional concepts of state 
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 1. J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (9th ed. 1984). 
 2. See, e.g., infra Part II.D, Part V. 
 3. See, e.g., Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs art. 36(2)(a)(iv), Mar. 30, 1961, 
520 U.N.T.S. 151; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Civil Aviation art. 6(1), Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; International Convention 
Against the Taking of Hostages art. 6(1), Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 
6(1), Dec. 12, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112. 
 4. See infra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. 
H 
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immunity had continued to be recognized by the courts,5 because until 
the middle of the last century, the immunity of a state and its ruler from 
the jurisdiction of another state’s courts was regarded as absolute, as per 
Louis XIV’s famous quip, “L’état c’est moi.”6 Fortunately, in the latter 
half of the 20th century, cracks began to appear in the doctrine of abso-
lute immunity for states and state officials. Accordingly, a state’s immu-
nity was limited to its noncommercial, public, or in other words, official 
acts. As a result, the immunity of state officials developed into two 
branches: absolute immunity, known as ratione personae or inviolability, 
which applied to heads of state and some other state officials during their 
terms in office, and a more limited form of immunity, known as ratione 
materiae or subject matter or functional immunity, which shielded all 
state officials from the jurisdiction of another state’s courts for acts 
committed in their “official capacities.”7 In 2002, the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) had its first opportunity to address the issue of state offi-
cial immunity in Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium.8 Faced with 
the question whether Belgium’s issuance of an arrest warrant for 
Congo’s foreign minister violated international law, the Court held that 
the inviolability from the jurisdiction of another state’s courts that at-
tached to an incumbent foreign minister prohibited another state from 
engaging even in preliminary acts of investigation and prosecution for 
core international crimes during the foreign minister’s term of office.9 In 
so doing, the Court rejected the argument that a customary law of state 
official immunity had developed since World War II so as to include an 
exception applicable in national courts for the most serious, or core in-
                                                                                                             
 5. See Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Efforts to 
define the concept of international crime and the reach of human rights, and to hold viola-
tors accountable, would amount to no more than emblematic gestures unless those re-
forms were accompanied by a corresponding dismantling of the long-standing doctrinal 
bastions that have impeded the exercise of domestic and international jurisdiction over 
state officials for violation of the new standards.”). 
 6. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 475:16 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 5th ed. 
1999). 
 7. Yoram Dinstein, Diplomatic Immunity from Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae, 15 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 76, 80 (1966) (“[D]iplomatic immunity ratione materiae and ratione 
personae became sharply distinguished from one another: the former consists of a per-
manent substantive immunity from the applicability of local law while the latter merely 
comprises a transitory procedural exemption from judicial process.”). 
 8. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) (Congo v. Bel-
gium), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/ 
icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF (last visited Jan. 13, 2006). 
 9. See id. at 21. 
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ternational crimes,10 treating state official immunity as an area of settled 
law,11 instead of a developing rule with parameters that are still unclear.12 
This Article will focus on the impact of the ICJ’s decision on the im-
munity of state officials from prosecution for core international crimes in 
national courts and its interrelationship with the jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC). Its basic premise is that the decision in 
Congo v. Belgium can plausibly be read to mean that the immunities of 
state officials from prosecution for core crimes in national courts remains 
intact. As a result, there is a danger that national courts will apply Congo 
v. Belgium to immunize state officials charged with core crimes. And, 
since the jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary, or secondary, to that 
of the states,13 it must defer to any state, even a non-party to the treaty, 
that in good faith investigates and/or prosecutes a crime within its juris-
diction.14 In these circumstances the ICC can claim the right to prosecute, 
only when a state is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the in-
vestigation or prosecution.”15 The ICC Statute, while it abrogates state 
official immunity for the core crimes within its jurisdiction, preserves 
those same immunities for non-party states.16 In light of Congo v. Bel-
gium, could it plausibly be argued that a state prosecution lacked genu-
                                                                                                             
 10. This Article will use the term “core crimes” to refer to all the offenses within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC (war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide) as well as 
torture. See Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials be Tried for International 
Crimes?  Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853, 868 
(2002) (discussing the legal implications of the ICJ decision) [hereinafter Cassese, Com-
ments]; Steffen Wirth, Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ’s Judgment in the Congo v. 
Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 877, 882–85 (discussing state immunity and its excep-
tions). 
 11. See Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 22. 
 12. Cf. Joseph W. Dellapanna, Head-of-State Immunity—Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act—Suggestion by the Department of State, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 528, 531 (1994) (“We 
are left, then, with an at best amorphous legal doctrine [(head of state immunity)] whose 
very existence is not entirely settled in U.S. law and whose reach is almost completely 
uncertain.”); Jerrold L. Mallory, Note, Resolving The Confusion Over Head of State Im-
munity: The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 177 (1986) (“While a sur-
vey of the international community’s approach to head of state immunity reveals wide 
agreement that heads of state are entitled to some immunity, there is no consensus on the 
extent of that immunity.”). 
 13. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Preamble art. 1, Jul. 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinaf-
ter ICC Statute]. 
 14. Id. art. 17(1)(a). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Compare id. art. 27 (stating the irrelevance of official capacity with regard to 
criminal liability), with art. 98(1) (asserting the ICC’s inability to require States to act 
inconsistently with their international obligations). 
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ineness if it extended immunity to a state official who committed interna-
tional crimes? 
The Article will first briefly trace the development of state official im-
munity until the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA) by the United States Congress in 1976.17 At this watershed, state 
immunity diverged from state official immunity.18 Thereafter, until the 
decision in Congo v. Belgium, courts in the United States struggled with 
and divided over how to resolve questions of state official immunity, 
demonstrating the need for clear guidance on this issue. Instead of pro-
viding the needed clarity, Congo v. Belgium did the opposite since it is 
susceptible to equally possible interpretations: 1) that there is no excep-
tion to state official immunity for core crimes in national courts; or 2) 
that there is an exception to the immunity of state officials in national 
courts when they are charged with core crimes. A dissection of the 
sources on which the ICJ relied resolves this quandary by revealing that 
the latter interpretation is the more viable. Finally, the Article will exam-
ine the immunity provisions of the ICC Statute and demonstrate how of-
ficials from states, like the U.S., that are not parties to the ICC Statute 
could permanently escape the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
II. THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
A. The State and the Sovereign are One 
Initially, there was no distinction between the immunities that a state 
and its ruler enjoyed from the jurisdiction of foreign courts.19 In this form 
of “absolute” immunity, the term “absolute” had dual significance: 1) 
there was “absolute” identity between the state and its ruler;20 and, 2) 
both were “absolutely,” i.e., without exception, immune from the juris-
                                                                                                             
 17. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976) [hereinafter 
FSIA]. 
 18. Since the passage of the FSIA, U.S. courts have struggled with the question 
whether it or a common law immunity controls in suits naming sitting heads of state. See 
infra Part II.C–D. 
 19. Shobha Varughese George, Note, Head-of-State Immunity in the United States 
Courts: Still Confused After All These Years, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1056 (1995) 
(“Historically, sovereign immunity for states and heads-of-state immunity were consid-
ered one and the same . . . .”). 
 20. For example, in the seminal United States Supreme Court case, The Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon, Chief Justice Marshall refers to the state (France) anthropomor-
phically as “NAPOLEON, the reigning emperor of the French,” or the “prince,” or by the 
personal pronoun, “he.” The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 passim 
(1812). 
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diction of another state’s courts.21 At this stage of the development of 
sovereign immunity, it was a rule based on reciprocity, convenience, and 
practicality predicated on the consent of all sovereigns not to exercise the 
absolute sovereignty they enjoyed over conduct within their territories.22 
B. The Twentieth Century: Separation Anxiety 
Over the next century, the model of the United States—anti-
monarchical and pro-democratic—led to a rapid decline in the number of 
monarchies, and, even in countries like Great Britain where monarchs 
remained, the powers and functions of government shifted away from the 
king or queen to an elected government.23 Thus, by the middle of the 
twentieth century, state immunity had begun to separate from head of 
state immunity, and diplomatic immunity emerged as a distinctly sepa-
rate branch of the law.24 
As states, or state-created entities, entered increasingly into commer-
cial transactions with one another, they needed to be able to enforce 
these commercial agreements in court.25 The result was the doctrine of 
                                                                                                             
 21. Id. at 136–40. There were three instances of immunity from the “absolute and 
complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty confers”: 1) 
“the exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a foreign 
territory;” 2) “the immunity which all civilized nations allow to foreign ministers;” and, 
3) “a sovereign is understood to cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction . . . where he 
allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions.”  Id. 
 22. Marshall wrote: 
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights 
and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with 
each other, and by an interchange of those good offices which humanity dic-
tates and its wants require, all sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in 
practice, in cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and 
complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty con-
fers. 
Id. at 136. 
 23. See 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 445 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts 
eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM]. 
 24. Id. § 447 n.2 (“The law relating to the position of Heads of State abroad has af-
finities with, but is now separate from, that relating to state immunity (which has a com-
mon origin in the identification of a sovereign with his state) and the treatment of diplo-
matic envoys (who also represent sovereign states).”). 
 25. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711–
14 (1976) (quoting Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the United States 
Department of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952)). 
Tate summarized the then current state practice: 
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“restricted” sovereign immunity, exemplified by the 1952 Tate Letter, 
which exempted a state’s purely commercial activities from absolute 
immunity in the courts of another state.26 The Tate Letter reflected the 
United States’ position that restricted immunity was emerging as a fea-
ture of customary international law.27 Moreover, it suggested that at least 
four exceptions to absolute immunity already existed in U.S. practice—
disputes in contract and tort, disputes relating to its merchant vessels, and 
disputes based on a government’s “commercial activities.”28 
Following the Tate Letter, whether foreign states were accorded im-
munity in U.S. courts became a political matter because the State De-
partment began to issue “suggestions of immunity” which were binding 
on the courts.29 It was primarily to eliminate the problems that had arisen 
as a result of the suggestion of immunity procedure,30 that Congress 
                                                                                                             
It is thus evident that with the possible exception of the United Kingdom little 
support has been found except on the part of the Soviet Union and its satellites 
for continued full acceptance of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity. 
There are evidences that British authorities are aware of its deficiencies and 
ready for a change. The reasons which obviously motivate state trading coun-
tries in adhering to the theory with perhaps increasing rigidity are most persua-
sive that the United States should change its policy. Furthermore, the granting 
of sovereign immunity to foreign governments in the courts of the United 
States is most inconsistent with the action of the Government of the United 
States in subjecting itself to suit in these same courts in both contract and tort 
and with its long established policy of not claiming immunity in foreign juris-
dictions for its merchant vessels. Finally, the Department feels that the wide-
spread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in com-
mercial activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing 
business with them to have their rights determined in the courts. For these rea-
sons it will hereafter be the Department’s policy to follow the restrictive theory 
of sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign governments 
for a grant of sovereign immunity. 
Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Restricted state immunity was recognized by the Supreme Court in cases such as 
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983), which states,  
“[I]mmunity is confined to suits involving the foreign sovereign’s public acts, and does 
not extend to cases arising out of a foreign state’s strictly commercial acts.” 
 29. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 30. Suggestions of immunity invaded the province of the court by determining ques-
tions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, i.e., whether a state’s acts were public 
(jure imperii) and therefore immune, or whether its acts were private (jure gestionis) and 
therefore not. See, e.g., George, supra note 19, at 1058 (“This method, however, was 
flawed because judicial reliance on State Department ‘suggestions’ led to inconsistent, 
and often politically-motivated results.”). 
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passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in 1976, transferring the 
determination of questions of sovereign immunity to the federal courts.31 
Some states, particularly those with a common law legal tradition, fol-
lowed the United States’ statutory approach to restricted state immu-
nity,32 while others reached the same position via court decisions.33 
C. Post-FSIA State Immunity 
The FSIA codified restrictive sovereign immunity.34 Structurally, it re-
tained immunity for a “foreign state,” 35 which includes its “political sub-
division[s]”36 and “agenc[ies] or instrumentalit[ies].”37 States are im-
mune from the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts, except in those cases pro-
vided for in the statute.38 The exceptions are: 1) waiver, 2) disputes over 
commercial activities, 3) disputes over rights to property “taken in viola-
tion of international law,” 4) disputes over rights to immovable property 
or property acquired by succession or gift in the U.S., 5) torts committed 
                                                                                                             
 31. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2000) (“Claims of foreign states to immunity should 
henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States in conformity with 
the principles set forth in [the FSIA].”). 
 32. E.g., State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, § 15 (Eng.), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123 
[hereinafter State Immunity Act 1978]; State Immunity Act, R.S.C., c. S-18 (1985), re-
printed in 21 I.L.M 798 (1982); Foreign States Immunities Act, 1985, pt. 5, § 42 (Austl.), 
reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 715 (1986). 
 33. E.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 12, 
1983 (F.R.G.), translated in 22 I.L.M. 1279; Cour de cassation [Cass. 1e civ.] [Court of 
Cassation], Mar. 14, 1984, J.C.P. 1984, II, 20205, note Gulphe (Fr.), translated in 23 
I.L.M. 1062; Corte cost., 15 July 1992, n.31, Gazz. Uff. 1992 (It.), translated in 33 I.L.M. 
593 (1994). 
 34. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)–(7) (2000). 
 35. Id. § 1602 (“Under international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction 
of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their commer-
cial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them 
in connection with their commercial activities.”). 
 36. Id. § 1603(a). 
 37. Section 1603(b) defines an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” as: 
any entity— 
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a ma-
jority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or 
political subdivision thereof, and 
(3) which is neither a citizen of the United States . . . , nor created under the 
laws of any third country. 
Id. § 1603 (b). 
 38. Id. § 1604. 
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in the U.S. by a foreign state, 6) enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, 
and 7) terrorist acts (including torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabo-
tage, and hostage taking) that result in the personal injury or death of a 
U.S. national committed by states that have been designated as state 
sponsors of terrorism.39 
The FSIA represents a functional (ratione materiae) approach to state 
immunity that is no longer absolute but rather is linked to the legitimate, 
public functions of the state. But, because it authorizes jurisdiction over a 
foreign state only in a limited and carefully circumscribed number of 
circumstances,40 it has stunted the growth of a more expansive approach 
to the liability of foreign states in U.S. courts.41 
The FSIA does contain two exceptions, torts and terrorism, both of 
which can be based on conduct that is also a crime. This suggests that 
Congress regarded such acts as non-public, because otherwise it would 
have exempted them from the immunity that shields state acts.42 More-
over, in two cases in which the FSIA’s jurisdictional  prerequisites were 
met,43 U.S. courts held that states sponsoring core crimes are not immune 
                                                                                                             
 39. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)–(7). 
 40. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983) (stating that 
unless a FSIA exception is satisfied, U.S. courts lack “subject matter jurisdiction.”); Ar-
gentine Rep. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 441 (1989) (concluding that 
FSIA does not permit suits for torts committed outside the United States). The terrorism 
exception applies only to terrorist acts committed by citizens of states designated by the 
State Department as “state sponsors of terrorism” that occur outside the foreign (defen-
dant) state and whose victims are nationals of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 
1605(a)(7)(A)–(B). 
 41. The FSIA exceptions require that the tort be committed in the United States under 
section 1605(a)(5), and that the terrorist act be committed outside the territory of a terror-
ist state and have as its victim a U.S. national under section 1605(a)(7)(B). In almost all 
of the post-World War II cases where states have been accused of international crimes, 
those crimes involve acts committed in those states against their nationals. By definition, 
then, they would fail the FSIA’s jurisdictional tests. See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, A Hu-
man Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts on Princz v. Federal Re-
public of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 403 (1995). 
 42. Cf. Letelier v. Rep. of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 671 (D.D.C. 1980) (“Nowhere is 
there an indication that the tortious acts to which the Act makes reference are to only be 
those formerly classified as ‘private,’ thereby engrafting onto the statute, as the Republic 
of Chile would have the Court do, the requirement that the character of a given tortious 
act be judicially analyzed to determine whether it was of the type heretofore denoted as 
jure gestionis or should be classified as jure imperii.”). 
 43. In Letelier v. Republic of Chile, the court held that Chile was not immune from 
suit in tort for assassinations, allegedly the work of the Chilean national intelligence ser-
vice, which took place in the United States, thus satisfying the “tort” exception to the 
FSIA. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). Rejecting Chile’s contention that the killings fell 
within exceptions to the “tort” exception because they were “discretionary function[s]” 
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from suit.44 By hypothesis, this reasoning would apply to state officials 
whose immunity ratione materiae is no more or less than the state’s.45 
D. State Official Immunity 
The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity applied to state officials 
as well; that is, they were immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts 
in so far as they acted in their “official” capacities on behalf of the state. 
In that case, the state official’s act is attributable solely to the state that 
bears responsibility for it.46 As a consequence, this form of immunity 
                                                                                                             
and therefore immune under the FSIA, the court stated: “Whatever policy options may 
exist for a foreign country, it has no ‘discretion’ to perpetrate conduct designed to result 
in the assassination of an individual or individuals, action that is clearly contrary to the 
precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and international law.”  Letelier, 488 
F. Supp. at 673 (emphasis added). In Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, the court found that 
the “extrajudicial killings” of American nationals over international waters by the Cuban 
Air Force not only satisfied the FSIA terrorism exception but also provided a basis for 
plaintiffs to seek punitive damages because “[t]he ban on extrajudicial killing . . . rises to 
the level of jus cogens, a norm of international law so fundamental that it is binding on all 
members of the international community.”  Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 
1239, 1252 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (citing, inter alia, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 702(c) (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)], which 
states, “A state violates [customary] international law if, as a matter of state policy, it 
practices, encourages, or condones . . . the murder or causing the disappearance of indi-
viduals . . . .”). 
 44. But see, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (holding that FSIA does not permit a suit for a jus cogens violation of interna-
tional law (torture) that occurred outside the United States); Princz v. Fed. Republic of 
Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding Germany immune under the 
FSIA for atrocities committed in Germany during the holocaust); accord Sampson v. Fed. 
Republic of Germany, 975 F. Supp. 1108, 1116 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Persinger v. Islamic 
Rep. of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding Iran immune from claims 
based on hostage taking outside the United States); Smith v. Libya, 886 F. Supp. 306, 315 
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding Libya immune from claims stemming from the Lockerbie 
bombing), aff’d 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Al-Adsani v. Gov’t of Kuwait, 107 
I.L.R. 536, 550 (1996) (holding Kuwait immune from allegations of torture committed 
outside the United Kingdom). 
 45. Cf. OPPENHEIM, supra note 23, at § 509 n.11 (“In respect of official acts it may 
not be so much a question of immunity from the jurisdiction of the local courts, but rather 
a matter of those courts being without competence rationae materiae over the acts, which 
pertain to the public activities of a foreign state.”). 
 46. Cassese, Comments, supra note 10, at 862 (“The first category [immunity ratione 
materiae] is grounded on the notion that a state official is not accountable to other states 
for acts that he accomplishes in his official capacity and that therefore must be attributed 
to the state.”). 
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ratione materiae applies both during and after an official’s term of of-
fice.47 
It is debatable whether a separate doctrine of head of state immunity 
even existed prior to the passage of the FSIA.48 In the rare pre-FSIA 
cases where a head of state was sued individually, courts seemed to ap-
ply the restrictive theory of state immunity.49 A state’s functional immu-
nity (ratione materiae) did not, however, fully cover its head of state in 
situations in which she or he traveled abroad and while in a foreign coun-
try might be faced with arrest or service of civil process.50 Not surpris-
ingly then, the concept of inviolability from arrest or suit (immunity ra-
tione personae) was imported from the law of diplomatic immunity and 
adapted to heads of state.51 
Because the FSIA does not refer specifically to heads of state or state 
officials, U.S. courts have divided over the question of the scope of their 
immunities. Some, like the court in Lafontant v. Aristide,52 have con-
cluded that incumbent heads of state are inviolable from either criminal 
or civil process, because individuals are not “agencies or instrumentali-
ties” as defined by the FSIA.53 Thus, State Department “suggestions of 
                                                                                                             
 47. Id. at 863. 
 48. See, e.g., Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“At 
the time of the FSIA’s adoption, no widely accepted international practice established a 
separately standing principle of head-of-state immunity. In fact, prior to 1976 the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity was generally understood to encompass solely state immunity. 
Consequently, any reference to a head-of-state immunity ‘doctrine’ as a concept distinct 
from foreign state immunity is a construct that does not arise in the case law and com-
mentary as a specifically identified and widely recognized legal principle until after 
1976.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Ex-King Farouk of Egypt v. Christian Dior, S.A.R.L., 24 I.L.R. 228, 
228, Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Apr. 11, 1957 (finding sitting 
king immune from suit in France for cost of wife’s wardrobe but could be sued after he 
was deposed); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 66 (1965) (under the restrictive theory, head of state immunity is the 
same as state immunity). 
 50. See, e.g., Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 308–09 (dealing with an attempt to serve 
Zimbabwe’s president with civil process while visiting New York to attend a U.N. con-
ference). 
 51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 464, Reporters’ Notes 14 (“Heads of 
state or government. Ordinarily, a proceeding against a head of state or government that 
is in essence a suit against the state is treated like a claim against the state for purposes of 
immunity. When a head of state or government comes on an official visit to another 
country, he is generally given the same personal inviolability and immunities as are ac-
corded to members of special missions, essentially those of an accredited diplomat.”). 
 52. See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 53. See also Estate of Domingo v. Republic of Philippines, 808 F.2d 1349, 1350 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (finding sitting head of state immune from claim based on murder of two op-
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immunity” remain binding on the courts in those cases and cases of dip-
lomatic and consular immunity, which likewise are not covered by the 
FSIA.54 The opposite approach, adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Chuidian 
v. Phillipine National Bank,55 is that a suit against a state official acting 
in his official capacity was tantamount to a suit against the state itself.56 
Accordingly, under this approach, the determination of state immunity 
questions belongs exclusively to the courts, applying the rules found in 
the FSIA.57 A third strain in the U.S. case law is illustrated by Tachiona 
v. Mugabe, where the court allowed service of civil process on a sitting 
head of state in his “private” capacity as an officer of an organization 
accused of the murder, torture, terrorism, rape, and beatings of his politi-
cal opponents.58 In so holding, the court rejected both the absolute invio-
lability approach of Aristide and Chuidian’s holding that the FSIA had 
completely supplanted the pre-FSIA procedure of using suggestions of 
immunity in cases involving sitting heads of state: 
While [there are] . . . valid grounds for the courts to honor the State 
Department’s suggestions of immunity . . . over a recognized sitting 
head of state that would subject the foreign official to be hauled into 
                                                                                                             
position union leaders); Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. at 129 (finding incumbent Haitian presi-
dent immune from civil suit based on assassination of political opponent); Saltany v. 
Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding British prime minister immune from 
suit for damages arising from U.S. bombing of Libya). 
 54. Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. at 136–37. 
 55. Chuidian v. Phillippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990). In Chuidian, 
the government filed a “statement of interest.” Id. at 1099. Unlike a “suggestion of im-
munity,” which was binding on the court, a “statement of interest” merely suggests “that 
courts decline to exercise jurisdiction in particular cases implicating sovereign immu-
nity.”  Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004). 
 56. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1102. While the term “official capacity” is not used in  
§ 1603(b) of the FSIA, it is that element, according to the Chuidian court, which makes a 
“suit against an individual . . . the practical equivalent of a suit against the sovereign di-
rectly.”  Id. at 1101. Thus, “Daza must be granted immunity as an instrumentality of the 
Republic of the Philippines . . . .”  Id. at 1106. However, “[p]lainly Daza would not be 
entitled to sovereign immunity for acts not committed in his official capacity.” Id. 
 57. Id. at 1103. According to the Chuidian court,  
 
The principal distinction between pre-1976 common law practice and post-1976 
statutory practice is the role of the State Department. If individual immunity is to 
be determined in accordance with the [former], presumably we would once again 
be required to give conclusive weight to the State Department’s determination of 
whether an individual’s activities fall within the traditional exceptions to sovereign 
immunity. 
 
Id. at 1102. 
 58. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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court and potentially be exposed to personal liability, the Court finds 
uncompelling the further contention that the doctrine requires courts to 
give conclusive effect to the State Department’s advice with regard to 
the appropriateness of service of process upon a head-of-state as it 
arises in this case.59 
By this view, immunity ratione personae does not mean absolute invio-
lability from all judicial processes of foreign courts.60 
While all of the above are civil cases, application of the contrasting ap-
proaches represented by Lafontant and Chuidian might lead to different 
results in criminal cases.61 According to the former, the incumbent offi-
cial would be entitled to absolute immunity regardless of the nature of 
her crime.62 On the other hand, the result under Chuidian would depend 
upon whether the official’s crime was deemed “public” and therefore 
immune, or “private” and therefore not immune.63 Chuidian is thus 
clearly at odds with the prevailing view of immunity ratione personae 
exemplified by Congo v. Belgium64 and more closely resembles the 
analysis that would be appropriate in cases involving immunity ratione 
materiae, where only “official” conduct would be immune. In the few 
U.S. cases that do deal with the immunity of a state official charged with 
conduct that resembles a core violation of international law, the trend 
appears to be away from deeming any such conduct as “official.”65 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. at 305; see also Estate of Domingo, 808 F.2d at 1350 (finding an order immu-
nizing President of the Philippines from civil suit did not shield him from a deposition 
subpoena in the same action). 
 60. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31(1)(c), Apr. 18, 1961, 23 
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter VCDR] (“[A diplomatic agent] shall also en-
joy immunity from [the receiving State’s] civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in 
the case of: . . . (c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised 
by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.”). 
 61. A court following Tachiona presumably would reach the same result as in Lafon-
tant, i.e., that the State Department’s suggestion of immunity would be binding in cases 
where there was an attempt to exercise the territorial jurisdiction of the court in order to 
arrest or prosecute an incumbent head of state. Cf. Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 270, with 
Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. at 132. 
 62. Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“We need not con-
sider whether an act of President Aristide in ordering the killing [of a political opponent] 
would be official or private because he now enjoys head-of-state immunity.”). 
 63. See Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1104. 
 64. See infra Part III. 
 65. Cf. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239–40 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The Executive 
Branch has emphatically restated in this litigation its position that private persons may be 
found liable under the Alien Tort Act for acts of genocide, war crimes, and other viola-
tions of international humanitarian law.”); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 175–76 
(D. Mass. 1995) (finding no FSIA immunity for former defense minister accused of tor-
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The doctrine of state immunity is in disarray in the United States. First, 
the FSIA has blocked a number of civil actions based on the commission 
of core crimes that could have contributed to the development of a rule 
that such acts are not the public acts of states.66 Second, the courts are 
divided on the impact of the FSIA on suits against individuals. As the 
divergent approaches in Lafontant v. Aristide, Chuidian v. Phillipine Na-
tional Bank, and Tachiona v. Mugabe illustrate, the courts have yet to 
conceive of or apply a consistent doctrine in deciding whether individu-
als are immune from suit or not. This may be due, in part, to the fact that 
U.S. courts almost never use the terms immunity ratione personae and 
immunity ratione materiae, and, as a result, they have not clearly identi-
fied the distinctions between the two doctrines.67 Thus, a definitive opin-
ion on state immunity from the ICJ could have benefited the develop-
ment of the law in the U.S. 
III. ENTER CONGO V. BELGIUM 
On April 11, 2000, a Belgian investigating magistrate issued an inter-
national arrest warrant for Adbulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (Yerodia), then 
the incumbent foreign minister of the Congo.68 Yerodia was alleged to 
have made “speeches inciting racial hatred during the month of August 
                                                                                                             
ture, arbitrary detention, and disappearance, which are “acts . . . beyond the scope of the 
official’s authority”); In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 571 (N.D. Ohio 
1985) (finding “political offense” exception to extradition inapplicable in cases where 
defendant is charged with crimes that are “inconsistent with international standards of 
civilized conduct.”); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“To 
the extent that Pena might have expected that Paraguay would not hold him responsible 
for his official acts, that was not a ‘justified’ expectation . . . .”). 
 66. See supra notes 40–44. 
 67. This may, in part, be due to the “act of state” doctrine in U.S. courts. Indeed, the 
similarities between a recent statement by the U.S. Supreme Court defining the act of 
state doctrine and the ICJ’s definition of immunity ratione materiae are striking. Com-
pare Rep. of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004) (“Unlike a claim of sovereign 
immunity, which merely raises a jurisdictional defense, the act of state doctrine provides 
foreign states with a substantive defense on the merits.”), with Congo v. Belgium, 2002 
I.C.J. 3, 22 (Feb. 14) (“Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal re-
sponsibility are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in 
nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity 
may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate 
the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility.”). While a definitive an-
swer to this question is beyond the scope of this Article, a tentative conclusion may be 
that U.S. courts refer to the act of state doctrine in the same way that foreign courts use 
the term immunity ratione materiae.  
 68. Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 8. 
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1998,”69 which constituted grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and their two 1977 Additional Protocols.70 These international 
crimes were punishable in Belgium pursuant to a 1999 law that gave its 
courts jurisdiction over such offenses “wheresoever they may have been 
committed,”71 and also contained the provision that “[i]mmunity attach-
ing to the official capacity of a person shall not prevent application of the 
present Law.”72 Congo protested by filing an application and a request 
for provisional measures before the ICJ claiming, inter alia, that the Bel-
gian law’s abrogation of the immunity of a sitting foreign minister was a 
“‘[v]iolation of the diplomatic immunity of the Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs of a sovereign State . . . .’”73 
The Court proceeded to the merits of the immunity question “assum-
ing” that the Belgian judge had jurisdiction to issue the arrest warrant in 
the first place.74 The Court reasoned that the immunities of incumbent 
diplomatic and consular agents, and “certain holders of high-ranking of-
fice in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs,” must be sufficient so that the official will not be 
hindered “in the performance of his or her duties.”75 Sitting foreign min-
isters and heads of state must therefore be accorded both “full immunity” 
                                                                                                             
 69. Id. 
 70. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field ch. IX, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Ge-
neva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea ch. VIII, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 74 
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 74 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War pt. IV, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 609 [hereinafter, collectively, the Geneva Conventions]. 
 71. Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian 
Law (Belg.), Feb. 10, 1999, art. 5(3), translated in 38 I.L.M. 918, 924 (1999). 
 72. Id. art. 7. 
 73. Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 9. 
 74. Initially, Congo had challenged Belgium’s assertion of universal jurisdiction as a 
“[v]iolation of the principle that a State may not exercise its authority on the territory of 
another State and of the principle of sovereign equality among all Members of the United 
Nations . . . .”  Id. Congo abandoned these arguments in its Memorial and at oral argu-
ment. Id. at 10. Mark A. Summers, The International Court of Justice’s Decision in 
Congo v. Belgium: How Has It Affected The Development of a Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction That Would Obligate All States to Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. INT’L 
L.J. 63, 67–68 (2003). 
 75. See Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 18–20. 
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and “inviolability” from the criminal jurisdiction of another state because 
any assertion of another state’s criminal process could affect their ability 
to travel internationally, one of their essential job functions.76 
Next, the Court had to dispose of Belgium’s argument that an excep-
tion to “full immunity” and “inviolability” ratione personae now exists 
for those incumbent state officials accused of war crimes or crimes 
against humanity.77 The Court flatly rejected the contention that there 
was state practice78 that supported the existence of such an exception. 
Nor did the statutes of the various international criminal tribunals estab-
lished since World War II, all of which specifically abolished “official 
position” immunity, amount to “state practice” because “these rules . . . 
do not enable [the Court] to conclude that any such exception exists in 
customary international law in regard to national courts.”79 Similarly, 
none of the cases of the international tribunals deals with “the question of 
the immunities of Ministers of Foreign Affairs before national courts 
where they are accused of having committed war crimes or crimes 
against humanity.”80 
Thus, the Court was “unable to deduce . . . that there exists under cus-
tomary international law any form of exception to the rule according 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Min-
isters for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having committed 
war crimes or crimes against humanity.”81 The Court then ventured even 
further to outline the exceptions to “the immunities enjoyed under inter-
national law by an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs.”82 
                                                                                                             
 76. See id. at 20. See, e.g., VCDR, supra note 60, at art. 29 (“The person of a diplo-
matic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or deten-
tion.”); id. art. 31(1) (“A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal juris-
diction of the receiving State.”). 
 77. Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 20. 
 78. Belgium had specifically cited the Pinochet case in the United Kingdom and the 
Qaddafi case in France as examples of such state practice. Id. The ICJ accepted Congo’s 
contention that neither of these cases stood for the abrogation of absolute immunity for 
“incumbent” heads of state and foreign ministers. Id. at 21. 
 79. Id. (emphasis added). 
 80. Id. 
 81. The Court did not mention or refer to the commentators who have urged that such 
an exception exists. See, e.g., Cassese, Comments, supra note 10, at 866–69. But see 
Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 20 (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buer-
genthal), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/ 
icobe_ijudgment_20020214_higgins-kooijmans-buergenthal.PDF. 
 82. The  “exceptions” are: 1) “such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under inter-
national law in their own countries;” 2) they cease to enjoy immunity from the jurisdic-
tion of another state “if the State they represent or have represented decides to waive that 
immunity;” 3) a former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be prosecuted by another state 
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Although this portion of its opinion is clearly obiter dictum, binding only 
the parties to the case and therefore has no formal precedential value, 
there is no doubt that Congo v. Belgium will substantially affect the de-
velopment of the law of state official immunity in both international and 
national courts.83 
IV. IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO STATE OFFICIAL IMMUNITY FOR CORE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES? 
The Congo v. Belgium decision might be read narrowly as applying 
only to the immunities ratione personae of incumbent foreign ministers. 
However, its sweeping conclusion—that there is no customary interna-
tional law exception “to the rule according immunity from criminal ju-
risdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers of Foreign affairs, 
where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes 
against humanity”84—may not be so neatly cabined in future cases.85 In-
deed, a broader reading of Congo v. Belgium is also plausible: There is 
no customary law exception to the immunity, ratione personae or ratione 
materiae, of state officials from the “criminal jurisdiction” of foreign 
courts, even for core international crimes.86 And, while a careful exami-
nation of the sources relied upon by the Court does not support such an 
                                                                                                             
“in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as 
in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity;” and, 4) 
“an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal pro-
ceedings before certain international courts, where they have jurisdiction.” Congo, 2002 
I.C.J. para. 61. 
 83. As Henkin writes, “A decision of the International Court of Justice is not binding 
on states other than the parties to the case, but judicial decisions are ‘subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law’ (article 38 of the Statute of the Court), and decisions of 
the court are highly authoritative.”  LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTER- 
NATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 49 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the Nicaragua case). 
 84. Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 21. 
 85. See infra Part VI. 
 86. Even one of the most distinguished scholars of international law has read this 
portion of the Court’s opinion differently at different times. Compare Cassese, Com-
ments, supra note 10, at 865 (“Although the Court’s proposition is very sweeping, the 
context of the Court’s ruling would seem to indicate that the Court did not intend to deny 
the possible existence of a customary rule lifting functional immunities for state officials 
in the case of international crimes. In fact, it did not take any stand on such a customary 
rule.”), with Antonio Cassese, The Belgian Court of Cassation v. The International Court 
of Justice: The Sharon and Others Case, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 437, 444 (2003) (“As I 
pointed out at the outset of this paper, the ICJ held, although not in explicit terms, that the 
functional immunity accruing to a minister of foreign affairs . . . does not cease when the 
person is accused of an international crime.”) [hereinafter Cassese, The Sharon and Oth-
ers Case]. 
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expansive reading of the case, regrettably, the opinion itself leaves us to 
guess the Court’s actual position. 
A. State Practice 
The Court said it had analyzed the state legislation that does exist and 
found it wanting in its support for the existence of an exception to state 
official immunity for core international crimes.87 The Court also appar-
ently accepted Congo’s interpretation that Regina v. Bartle and the 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pino-
chet88 and the Qaddafi89 case “confirm the absolute nature of the immu-
nity from criminal process of Heads of State and Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs.”90 A closer analysis of the cases is necessary in order to appreci-
ate the import of this conclusion. 
First, since Pinochet was a former head of state, the extent of incum-
bent head of state immunity for torture was not squarely before the two 
different panels of the House of Lords that considered the case.91 None-
theless, altogether seven of the Law Lords posited that an exception to 
                                                                                                             
 87. In this regard, it is telling that the Court did not refer to the 1999 Belgian law, Act 
Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law 
(Belg.), Feb. 10, 1999, translated in 38 I.L.M. 918, 924 (1999), on which Congo v. Bel-
gium itself was based and which specifically abolished head of state immunity for core 
crimes. See also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
art. IV, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (“Persons committing genocide . . . shall be 
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private 
individuals.”); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 (“‘[T]orture’ means 
any act by which severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . by 
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity . . . .”). There are currently 137 state parties to the 
Genocide Convention and 140 state parties to the Torture Convention. Multilateral Trea-
ties Deposited With the Secretary-General, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/ 
englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty1.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).  For a discus-
sion of the significance of state ratifications of international conventions as state practice, 
see infra text accompanying notes 126–39. 
 88. Regina v. Bartle & the Comm’r of Police for the Metropolis & Others Ex Parte 
Pinochet (Pinochet II), [2000] 1 A.C. 119 (H.L. 1999) reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581 (1999). 
 89. Cour de Cassation (Fr.), Mar. 13, 2001, Judgment No. 1414, reprinted in 105 
REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 473 (2001); see also Salvatore Zap-
palà, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for International 
Crimes?  The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
595, 596 (2001) (discussing the Qaddafi case). 
 90. Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 21. 
 91. The question was also considered in Regina v. Bow St. Stipendiary Magistrate & 
Others Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Pinochet I), [2000] 1 A.C. 61 (H.L. 1998). In Congo v. 
Belgium, the ICJ referred only to Pinochet II. 
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immunity exists when a head of state is charged with a serious interna-
tional crime.92 Although on this view, head of state immunity is no 
longer absolute, four of the Pinochet judges limited the exception to im-
munity ratione materiae, opining that immunity ratione personae would 
shield a sitting head of state, even one charged with torture.93 
In Qaddafi, the Libyan leader was sued in France based on his gov-
ernment’s involvement in terrorist acts that caused the crash of a French 
airliner and the death of French nationals.94 Although highly critical of 
the French Cour de Cassation’s decision,95 one commentator’s interpreta-
tion of it is far more nuanced than the ICJ’s: 
The decision . . . implicitly admits the possibility of exceptions to im-
munity from jurisdiction of Heads of State in office. The Court con-
cluded: ‘at this stage of development of international customary law, 
the crime charged [i.e., terrorism], no matter how serious does not fall 
within the exceptions to the principle of immunity from jurisdiction of 
foreign Heads of State in office.’ An a contrario interpretation of this 
passage leads to the conclusion that there are crimes that constitute ex-
ceptions of the jurisdictional immunity of Heads of State. This passage, 
however, does not shed any light on the type of immunity involved.96 
Thus, the Pinochet and Qaddafi cases actually evince the views of 
those courts that an exception to state official immunity exists for at least 
                                                                                                             
 92. Pinochet II, 38 I.L.M. at 594 (Lord Browne-Williamson); id. at 626 (Lord Hope 
of Craighead); id. at 637 (Lord Hutton); id. at 661 (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers); 
Pinochet I, [2000] 1 A.C. at 108–09 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead); id. at 115 (Lord 
Steyn); id. at 118 (Lord Hoffman); but see id. at 79–82 (Lord Slynn of Hadley); id. at 96–
97 (Lord Lloyd of Berwick). 
 93. Pinochet II, 38 I.L.M. at 641–42 (Lord Saville of Newdigate); id. at 643–45 (Lord 
Millett); id. at 661 (Lord Phillips of Worth-Matravers); Pinochet I, [2000] 1 A.C. at 107–
09 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead). 
 94. Cour de Cassation (Fr.), Mar. 13, 2001, Judgment No. 1414, reprinted in 105 
REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 473 (2001); see also Zappalà, supra 
note 89, at 596. 
 95. The French high court’s opinion has been described as a “three-page terse and 
poorly reasoned decision.”  Zappalà, supra note 89, at 596. Zappalà criticizes this hold-
ing, inter alia, for failing to consider whether Qaddafi was in fact a head of state; failing 
to distinguish between immunity ratione personae and ratione materiae; failing to “clar-
ify whether it considered that exceptions to functional immunity for international crimes 
are provided for only by conventional texts or also by customary rules”; and failing to 
explain why terrorism is not an international crime. Id. 
 96. Id. at 600–01. The French version of the excerpt quoted above reads: “[E]n l’état 
du droit international, le crime dénoncé, quelle qu’en soit la gravité, ne relève pas des 
exceptions au principe de l’immunité de juridiction de chefs d’Etats étrangers en exer-
cice.”  Id. at 601 n.30. 
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some core international crimes,97 although the cases do not make the pa-
rameters of the exception clear. The ICJ must have either ignored or re-
jected this interpretation when, referring specifically to these cases, it 
stated that it had not been able to “deduce . . . any form of exception to 
the rule according immunity . . . to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Af-
fairs, where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or 
crimes against humanity.”98 
B. The Post-World War II International Tribunals 
The Court next analyzed post-war international practice. Since World 
War II, the statutes of every tribunal created to prosecute core crimes 
have abolished official position immunity. In Congo v. Belgium, the ICJ 
limited the significance of these developments to international courts, 
stating that “the rules concerning the immunity or criminal responsibility 
of persons having an official capacity . . . do not enable it to conclude 
that any such exception exists in customary international law in regard to 
national courts.”99 A plausible interpretation of the quoted language 
might be that the Court meant only that it found that no such exception 
exists in national courts only with regard to immunity ratione personae. 
This position is at least defensible because immunity ratione personae 
(inviolability) does shield incumbent officials and diplomats from prose-
cution, even for crimes.100 However this reading is rendered less tenable 
because of the Court’s use of the phrase “persons having an official ca-
pacity,” which would have been superfluous if the Court were referring 
only to immunity ratione personae, which covers all acts, official and 
unofficial. And, significantly, “official capacity” is the term used in the 
statutes of the international tribunals to refer to immunity ratione mate-
riae. Is the ICJ then saying that no customary law exception for interna-
tional crimes exists with regard to immunity ratione materiae in national 
                                                                                                             
 97. Torture cases were also initiated against Pinochet in France and Germany, pre-
sumably because he was not believed to be immune as a former head of state. See Sum-
mers, supra note 74, at 90–91 n.142. 
 98. Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 21. 
 99. Id. (emphasis added). From a purely logical perspective, this statement is curious 
indeed. Absolute sovereign (including head of state) immunity was a rule of customary 
international law that prohibited the courts of one state from sitting in judgment on the 
acts of another; that is, by definition it was applicable only in national courts. How then 
could any exception to that customary rule not apply in national courts? 
 100. See supra Part II.D. 
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courts?101 That would create a substantial jurisdictional loophole in na-
tional courts prosecuting international crimes. 
1. Nuremberg 
The exception to absolute state official immunity for core international 
crimes first appeared in the Nuremberg Charter, which was a response to 
the largely failed attempt to judicially punish those responsible for World 
War I. During the peace negotiations following the First World War, a 
divided Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War and 
Enforcement of Penalties recommended to the Preliminary Peace Con-
ference that criminal charges be brought against the German emperor.102 
The novelty of this proposal was reflected by the objection interposed by 
the U.S. representatives on the Commission that: 
[they were] unable to agree with this conclusion, in so far as it subjects 
to criminal, and therefore, to legal prosecution, persons accused of of-
fenses ‘against the laws of humanity,’ and in so far as it subjects Chiefs 
of States to a degree of responsibility hitherto unknown to municipal or 
international law, for which no precedents are to be found in the mod-
ern practice of nations (emphasis in the original).103 
Thereafter, in what was evidently compromise language, the Treaty of 
Versailles charged Kaiser William II with “a supreme offence against 
international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”104 Commentators, 
writing shortly before the Nuremberg Charter was adopted in 1945, dis-
agreed whether the Versailles Treaty charged the Kaiser with a 
“crime”105 or whether it merely alleged “breaches not of international law 
                                                                                                             
 101. That is precisely how the Special Court for Sierra Leone read the ICJ’s opinion in 
Congo v. Belgium in the Charles Taylor case. See Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, 
Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, paras. 50–52 (May 
31, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/SCSL-03-01-I-059.pdf. 
 102. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement 
of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (Mar. 29, 1919), 
reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT’L. L. 95, 95–104 (1920). The Commission wrote, “All persons 
belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without dis-
tinction of rank, including Chiefs of States, who have been guilty of offences against the 
laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution . . . .” 
Id. at 117. 
 103. S.S. Gregory, Criminal Responsibility of Sovereigns for Willful Violations of the 
Laws of War, 6 VA. L. REV. 400, 414 (1920). 
 104. Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), art. 227, June 28, 1919, 2 
Bevans 43, 136. 
 105. Hans Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with 
Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 CAL. L. REV. 530, 545 (1943). 
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but of international morality . . . .”106 In any event, the dispute went unre-
solved because the Netherlands, where the Kaiser had sought refuge after 
the war, refused to surrender him for trial.107 
There were, nonetheless, some war crimes prosecutions following 
World War I. The disappointing results were six convictions and six ac-
quittals with the longest sentences of four years imprisonment imposed 
on two German sailors who intentionally fired upon the survivors of a 
British hospital ship.108 However, even this prosecution was frustrated by 
the assertion of the “superior orders” defense, according to which a sol-
dier is not guilty of a war crime committed on the orders of a superior 
officer, unless such commands are “manifestly and undisputably [sic] 
illegal.”109 
A superior order can also be what Hans Kelsen referred to as an “act of 
State”110 if it was “issued by the government (Head of State, cabinet, 
member of cabinet, parliament), or issued at the command or with the 
authorization of the government.”111 Thus understood, the two de-
fenses—superior orders and act of State—could operate in tandem to 
shield those both up and down the chain of command from individual 
criminal responsibility.112 Equally important is the fact that these de-
fenses were customary international law rules applicable in national 
courts: 
                                                                                                             
 106. George Manner, The Legal Nature and Punishment of Criminal Acts of Violence 
Contrary to the Laws of War, 37 AM. J. INT’L L. 407, 416 (1943). 
 107. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 749 (2d ed. 
2000). 
 108. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET NO. 27-161-2, 2 INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 221–22 (1962). Three German officers, one of whom did not stand trial, agreed to 
destroy all 234 survivors of the British hospital ship, Llandovery Castle, because they 
witnessed the sinking. They were acquitted of sinking the ship based on the “superior 
orders” defense but convicted of killing the survivors because this was the “rare and ex-
ceptional case” where “it was perfectly clear to the accused that killing defenceless peo-
ple in the lifeboats could be nothing else but a breach of the law.” Kelsen, supra note 
105, at 558–59 n.30. 
 109. Kelsen, supra note 105, at 558. 
 110. As Kelsen uses the term “act of State,” it means simply an official act of the sort 
over which foreign courts would not have jurisdiction by virtue of immunity ratione ma-
teriae. Id. at 541–42. 
 111. This is true even if the ordered act violated international law. Id. at 556. 
 112. Kelsen also recognized that these defenses would frustrate most war crimes 
prosecutions since a state “is nearly always in a position to justify its acts from the point 
of view of national law by the necessities of war” and in “autocratic states like Nazi 
Germany” the “legal power conferred by national law . . . upon the head of the State as 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces with respect to the conduct of war is almost 
unlimited.”  Id. at 557. 
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The collective responsibility of a State for its own acts excludes, ac-
cording to general international law, the individual responsibility of the 
person who, as a member of the government, at the command or with 
the authorization of the government, has performed the act. This is a 
consequence of the immunity of the State from the jurisdiction of an-
other State.113 
To avoid the problems that had arisen in the post-World War I prose-
cutions,114 the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter115 made explicit the ex-
ception to immunity based on “official position” and the elimination of 
the superior orders defense.116 And, despite substantial evidence to the 
contrary, at least one commentator of the time concluded that “the law 
stated in Articles 7 [official position] and 8 [superior orders] of the Char-
ter . . . was amply supported by general principles of law which consti-
tute a source of international law.”117 
                                                                                                             
 113. Id. at 540–41. 
 114. According to Kelsen’s rigidly positivist view, individuals could not be prosecuted 
for war crimes “[having] the character of acts of State” unless their state of nationality 
consented in the peace treaty. Nevertheless, he believed that Article 228 of the Treaty of 
Versailles could be “interpreted as the necessary consent,” though he recommended “in-
sert[ing] into a future international treaty conferring upon a national or international court 
jurisdiction over war criminals, an express provision including war crimes which have 
the character of acts of State.”  Id. at 561. 
 115. Kelsen also doubted that “the rules of general internation[al] law . . . are favor-
able” to the establishment of tribunals to try war criminals by occupying powers on the 
territory of their defeated enemy. Despite that potential objection, that was the procedure 
adopted by the Allies in the London Agreement which created the Nuremberg tribunals. 
Id. at 561–62 n.35. 
 116. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 7, Aug. 8, 1948, 59 Stat. 1544, 
1548 (“The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible offi-
cials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsi-
bility or mitigating punishment.”); id. art. 8 (“The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant 
to Order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but 
may be considered in mitigation of punishment . . . .”). In addition to the United States, 
the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain, by whose agreement the Charter was 
adopted, it was subsequently ratified by nineteen other states. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 562 (4th ed. 1990). 
 117. Quincy Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 71 
(1947). But see Kelsen, supra note 105, at 543–44. Kelsen, a contemporary of Wright’s, 
criticizes as “very questionable” the use of “general principles of law . . . as sources of 
international law.” Another of Wright’s contemporaries flatly contradicts him: “However, 
if foreign law may be applied in this situation without violating the rule against ex post 
facto criminal punishment, its application is, of course, limited by the defenses act of 
state [immunity ratione materiae] and superior orders since they are part of the law of 
war.”  Manner, supra note 106, at 419. 
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The Charter was an “exercise of the sovereign legislative power of the 
countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and 
the undoubted right of these countries to legislate for the occupied terri-
tories has been recognized by the civilized world.”118 In an article written 
shortly after the Nuremberg trials ended, Quincy Wright argued that the 
parties to the Charter were justified in exercising jurisdiction over the 
Nuremberg defendants as an extraterritorial application of their criminal 
jurisdictions or as a derivative of their temporary sovereignty over Ger-
many.119 Either way, the trials were examples of “national” courts sitting 
in judgment of charges of core international crimes,120 as to which the 
official position immunity defense was unavailable because it had been 
abrogated by the Charter. 
In 1946, the UN General Assembly unanimously affirmed the princi-
ples of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment.121 In 1950, the General 
Assembly recalled this affirmation122 and received the International Law 
Commission formulation of these Principles, which included the aboli-
tion of state official immunity for core international crimes.123 This ac-
tion swiftly led to the universal recognition that the Nuremberg princi-
ples were customary international law.124 Thus, whatever uncertainty 
                                                                                                             
 118. Int’l Military Tribunal, XXII Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the Int’l 
Military Tribunal 461 (1947) (opinion and judgment as to jurisdiction on Sept. 30, 1946). 
 119. Wright, supra note 117, at 49–51. In Pinochet II, Lord Millet described in some 
detail how the tribunals administered “Nuremberg law”: 
The great majority of war criminals were tried in the territories where the 
crimes were committed. As in the case of the major war criminals tried at Nur-
emberg, they were generally (though not always) tried by national courts or by 
courts established by the occupying powers. The jurisdiction of these courts has 
never been questioned and could be said to be territorial. But everywhere the 
plea of state immunity was rejected in respect of atrocities committed in the 
furtherance of state policy in the course of the Second World War; and no-
where was this justified on the narrow (though available) ground that there is 
no immunity in respect of crimes committed in the territory of the forum state. 
Pinochet II, at 647. 
 120. Genocide was not defined as a separate crime in the Nuremberg Charter. 
 121. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/64/Add.1 (1946). 
 122. G.A. Res. 488 (V), U.N. GAOR, 320th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). 
 123. The Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter and the Judgment 
of the Nürnberg Tribunal: Report of the International Law Commission to the General 
Assembly, 5 U.N. GAOR, Sup. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 364, 374, U.N. Doc. A/CN/.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1. The Congo v. 
Belgium opinion did not mention this resolution or consider its effect. 
 124. See BROWNLIE, supra note 116, at 562. 
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may have existed prior to World War II regarding the customary law 
status of an exception to state official immunity for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, it had been completely erased shortly after the 
war. And, since the law of Nuremberg was an exercise of national legis-
lative authority administered in national courts by national authorities,125 
it is difficult to see how it could be construed as other than “state prac-
tice” evidencing the abrogation of head of state immunity in “national” 
courts. 
2. Post-Nuremberg 
Since then, all of the other tribunals created by the international com-
munity to prosecute core crimes have explicitly abolished head of state 
immunity. The language in each of these statutes is almost identical with 
that in the Nuremberg Charter.126 This consistent and frequent reaffirma-
tion by the international community of a principle of law only reinforces 
its customary stature. But, does it represent “state practice” that the rule 
is applicable in national courts? 
Although these statutes are not directly applicable in national tribunals, 
they do represent the consensus of the international community that war 
                                                                                                             
 125. In all, 1,416 defendants were convicted by the tribunal established by the United 
States to try war criminals within its “zone.”  Similar tribunals were established by 
France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union who controlled the other zones into which 
Germany was divided in the immediate post-war period. These zonal tribunals were the 
equivalent of state courts. FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE 
NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1949), re-
printed in PAUST ET AL., supra note 107, at 633–35. 
 126. Compare Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via, art. 7(2), Annex to the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) at 39, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) (“The 
official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a 
responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility 
nor mitigate punishment.”), with Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 
6(2), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex, at 6, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (1994) (“The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of 
State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such per-
son of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”), and ICC Statute, supra note 13, 
art. 27 (“This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on 
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as Head of State or Government . . . shall 
in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in 
and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.”), and Statute of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, art. 6(2), Annex to the Agreement on the Establishment of a Spe-
cial Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, U.N.-Sierra Leone, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145, 147 
(“The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government 
or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal respon-
sibility nor mitigate punishment.”). 
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criminals, regardless of their official position, should not escape justice 
no matter where they are prosecuted.127 Like the international tribunal at 
Nuremberg, these courts were set up to prosecute the most prominent 
wrongdoers, leaving the others for prosecution in the national courts.128 It 
would be ironic indeed if the statutes of the international tribunals evi-
dence only that state official immunity has been abolished in interna-
tional courts, since if that were so, a head of state would not be immune 
in the international court, whereas those carrying out his orders, if tried 
in a national court, would be. This is precisely the outcome in reverse 
that the changes in the law of immunities initiated by Nuremberg were 
intended to preclude. 
This outcome is also not supported by the ICJ’s analysis of the post-
war tribunals as “state practice,”129 because the Court did not consider 
the significance of the voting in the Security Council for the resolutions 
that created the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via (ICTY),130 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),131 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.132 Nor did it refer to the number 
of state ratifications of the ICC treaty.133 While scholars argue over the 
                                                                                                             
 127. Cf. Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal 
Court, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 407, 420 (2004) (“[B]y providing that the ICC Statute applies to 
state officials, Article 27(1) establishes that those officials are subject to prosecution by 
the ICC even when they acted in their official capacity.”). 
 128. See, e.g., Press Release, ICTY, Address of the Prosecutor at the Inauguration of 
the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of B-H, Sarajevo (Mar. 9, 2005), available at 
http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2046 (last visited Jan. 10, 2006) 
(recognizing the concurrent jurisdiction of the ICTY and the national courts). 
 129. Interestingly, the Court limited its examination to “state practice” and did not 
mention “opinio juris,” the other element necessary for the formulation of a rule of cus-
tomary international law. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Ap-
proaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 757 
(2001). As the inquiry is usually formulated, in order to be recognized as customary in-
ternational law, a rule must be supported by “general and consistent practice by states” 
that is “followed out of a belief of legal obligation [opinio juris].”  Id. 
 130. U.N. Security Council Resolution 827 was adopted by a vote of 15-0. S.C. Res. 
827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
 131. U.N. Security Council Resolution 955 was adopted by a vote of 13-1, with China 
abstaining and Rwanda opposing. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.3453 (1994). 
 132. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1315, 14 Aug. 2000, was passed 15-0. Meet-
ings Conducted/Actions Taken by the Security Council in 2000, http://www.un.org/ 
Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2000.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). 
 133. The ICC treaty, which went into force July 1, 2002, currently has 100 parties and 
139 signatories. None of the parties or signatories has submitted reservations or interpre-
tive declarations regarding Article 27 of the treaty which abolishes official position im-
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weight to be attached to such votes134 or ratifications135 or even whether 
voting and ratification amount to “state practice” [action] or “opinio ju-
ris” [statements of legal obligation],136 in this case all of the assenting 
states were self-consciously voting for or ratifying a body of legal rules 
that they understood were customary international law.137 Thus their 
votes or ratifications are by definition expressions of their beliefs in the 
validity of the legal principles contained in the statutes of the tribunals. 
Finally, when the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY considered the question 
whether “official position” immunity insulates state officials from com-
                                                                                                             
munity. Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, http:// 
untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty11.asp. 
 134. Compare Daniel H. Joyner, The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More 
Persuasive Paradigm, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 597, 615 (2002) (“[D]ecisions of the Security 
Council and the actions taken in pursuance thereof, in and of themselves, do not create 
customary international law.”), with John Alan Cohan, The Bush Doctrine and the 
Emerging Norm of Anticipatory Self-Defense in Customary International Law, 15 PACE 
INT’L L. REV. 283, 295 (2003) (“[T]he voting patterns of the United States in the U.N. 
Security Council and policy statements made on behalf of the United States in the Secu-
rity Council are formal state expressions of opinio juris on the practice [anticipatory self-
defense] at issue.”). 
 135. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ famously opined: 
With respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary before a con-
ventional rule can be considered to have become a general rule of international 
law, it might be that, even without the passage of any considerable period of 
time, a very widespread and representative participation in the convention 
might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose interests were 
specially affected. 
North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20), 
para. 73. 
 136. Cf. Roberts, supra note 129, at 758, where the author argues that: 
[M]odern custom is derived by a deductive process that begins with general 
statements of rules rather than particular instances of practice. This approach 
emphasizes opinio juris rather than state practice because it relies primarily on 
statements rather than actions. Modern custom can develop quickly because it 
is deduced from multilateral treaties and declarations by international fora such 
as the General Assembly, which can declare existing customs, crystallize 
emerging customs, and generate new customs. 
 137. When they voted unanimously for U.N. Security Council Resolution 827, the 
members of the Council clearly understood that they “would not be creating or purporting 
to ‘legislate’ that law. Rather, the International Tribunal would have the task of applying 
existing international humanitarian law.”  Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 
3, 1993). See Zappalà, supra note 89, at 603. The same would hold true for the other 
tribunals since their statutes, as noted above, contained nearly identical language regard-
ing the abrogation of “official position” immunity. 
2006] IMMUNITY OR IMPUNITY? 489 
plying with the orders of international tribunals to produce evidence, it 
concluded that the exception to state official immunity for core crimes is 
customary law applicable in national as well as international courts:138 
The general rule under discussion [“official position” immunity] is well 
established in international law and is based on the sovereign equality 
of States (par in parem non habet imoperium). The few exceptions re-
late to one particular consequence of the rule. These exceptions arise 
from the norms of international criminal law prohibiting war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide. Under these norms, those re-
sponsible for such crimes cannot invoke immunity from national or in-
ternational jurisdiction even if they perpetrated such crimes while act-
ing in their official capacity.139 
The need for the ICJ to clarify whether there is a customary interna-
tional law exception to “official position” immunity in national courts 
should be apparent. As the above analysis demonstrates, the same au-
thorities on which it relied in Congo v. Belgium support the existence of 
such a rule. Moreover, it is especially important for the Court to affirm in 
clear terms that the exception applies in national courts because the fail-
ure to do so could not only deleteriously affect the prosecution of core 
crimes in national courts, but also the ICC’s ability to do so as well. 
V. STATE OFFICIAL IMMUNITY AND THE ICC STATUTE 
The ICC statute has three separate provisions pertaining to state offi-
cial immunity. Article 27(1) contains language nearly identical to that in 
statutes of the other post-war tribunals.140 It abolishes immunity ratione 
materiae in cases before the court. Article 27(2) is new and it eliminates 
immunity ratione personae: “Immunities or special procedural rules 
                                                                                                             
 138. In Congo v. Belgium, the ICJ found no support for this proposition in the cases of 
the ICTY cited by Belgium, among which this case was not included. See Congo, 2002 
I.C.J. at 21; Counter Memorial of the Kingdom of Belgium, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 
2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) (Sept. 28, 2001), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobepleadings/icobe_ipleading_countermemorial_belgiu
m_20010928.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
 139. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment on the Request of the Re-
public of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, para. 
41 (Oct. 29, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/appeal/decision-e/7102 
9JT3.html. 
 140. ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 27(1) (“This Statute shall apply equally to all 
persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity 
as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected 
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for re-
duction of sentence.”). 
490 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 31:2 
which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under na-
tional or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its ju-
risdiction over such a person.”141 Some commentators have asserted that 
Article 27(2) applies to immunity ratione materiae as well as immunity 
ratione personae.142 However, this reading of the statute seems unlikely, 
since it would render Article 27(1) surplusage. Moreover, Article 27(1) 
makes a specific reference to exemption from “criminal responsibility,” 
the theoretical basis of immunity ratione materiae, whereas Article 27(2) 
refers to exercise of the Court’s “jurisdiction,” the concept behind im-
munity ratione personae.143 If this narrower reading of Article 27(2) is 
accepted, then the Court would have jurisdiction over the defendant by 
virtue of the waiver of her immunity ratione personae and she would be 
precluded from raising immunity rationae materiae as a defense to any 
of the substantive charges levied by the Court by virtue of Article 
27(1).144 
In addition, Article 27, when read in conjunction with Article 98(1),145 
is asserted by some to constitute a state party’s waiver of all the immuni-
ties of their officials even before the national courts of other state par-
ties.146 The counter interpretation is that the state parties to the ICC Stat-
ute have waived state official immunity only with regard to the cases 
before the ICC.147 The adherents of both positions seem to agree that 
                                                                                                             
 141. Id. art. 27(2). 
 142. E.g., David S. Koller, Immunities of Foreign Ministers: Paragraph 61 of the 
Yerodia Judgment as it Pertains to the Security Council and the International Criminal 
Court, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 7, 37 (2004) (“Article 27(2) eliminates both immunity 
ratione materiae and immunity ratione personae before the ICC.”). 
 143. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 144. But see Akande, supra note 127, at 420 (“Article 27(2) conclusively establishes 
that state officials are subject to prosecution by the ICC and that provision constitutes a 
waiver by states parties of any immunity that their officials would otherwise possess vis-
à-vis the ICC.”). 
 145. ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 98(1) (“The Court may not proceed with a request 
for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently 
with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immu-
nity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the coopera-
tion of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.”). 
 146. See Akande, supra note 127, at 422; Koller, supra note 142, at 38–40; Jann K. 
Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive 
International Criminal Law, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 86, 106 (2003); Micaela Fruilli, The 
Question of Charles Taylor’s Immunity—Still in Search of a Balanced Application of 
Personal Immunities?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1118, 1129 (2004). 
 147. See Cassese, The Sharon and Others Case, supra note 86, at 442 (“Under another, 
more convincing interpretation, immunities are lifted only in proceedings before the 
ICC.”). 
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state officials of non-parties retain all their immunities before the na-
tional courts of other states, even those that are parties to the ICC stat-
ute.148 As will be demonstrated below, in tandem with the decision in 
Congo v. Belgium, this could result in total impunity from prosecution 
for core crimes for non-party state officials.   
Two examples will illustrate this point: 
Case 1. Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and a change 
in its government, Afghanistan149 could refer to the Court an allegation 
that a former U.S. Secretary of Defense had authorized the use of torture 
in the interrogation of prisoners captured in Afghanistan during the Af-
ghan conflict, and therefore had committed “grave breaches” of the Ge-
neva Prisoners of War Convention.150 
If the U.S. requests that the ICC defer to its investigation,151 under the 
“complementarity” provisions in Article 17 of the ICC Statute, the Court 
must defer even to a non-party state, like the U.S., unless “the State is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecu-
tion.”152 A zealous U.S. Attorney, who is a veteran of the ICTY, indicts, 
and the former Secretary moves to dismiss the indictment because he 
was acting in his official capacity when he authorized the interrogations 
in Afghanistan. The U.S. judge, unable to resolve the immunity question 
under U.S. law because there are no cases directly on point, turns to the 
customary international law of immunity, which is applicable in U.S. 
courts.153 She reads Congo v. Belgium to mean that there is no customary 
law exception to immunity for core crimes in national courts and grants 
the motion to dismiss the indictment. 
Case 2. The newly recognized state of Palestine accedes to the ICC 
Statute. Thereafter, it charges that a former Israeli prime minister com-
mitted a war crime when he authorized the Israeli air force bombing of 
civilian targets in Gaza. Palestine requests that the United Kingdom, an-
other state party to the ICC Treaty, arrest and extradite the former prime 
minister, who is in London to give a speech. 
                                                                                                             
 148. See supra notes 146–47. 
 149. Afghanistan is a party to the ICC Statute and could therefore make such a referral 
under Article 14. 
 150. Geneva Conventions, supra note 70. 
 151. See ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 17(1). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of 
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The former prime minister challenges the extradition request in the 
British courts on the ground that he was acting in his official capacity 
when he authorized the bombing of Gaza targets. The British judge reads 
Congo v. Belgium to mean that there is no customary law exception to 
immunity for core crimes in national courts and refuses the extradition 
request. In either of these cases could the judges’ immunity decisions 
provide bases for the ICC to assert its jurisdiction because the states are 
“unwilling” to prosecute?154 
The answer to this question is arguably, “No.” The ICC Statute defines 
“unwillingness in a particular case” as “proceedings . . . undertaken . . . 
for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal respon-
sibility,” or “proceedings . . . not conducted independently or impar-
tially” or “in a manner . . . inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice.”155 These standards are simply inapposite in a case 
where a judge, based on a plausible interpretation of a less than pellucid 
decision of the ICJ, determines that a former state official has immu-
nity.156 This is especially true since in these cases the courts’ decisions 
are based on immunity ratione materiae which, unlike immunity ratione 
personae, does not simply temporarily defeat an assertion of jurisdiction 
but rather provides a complete, permanent defense because the alleged 
criminal act is chargeable only to the state and not to the individual act-
ing on its behalf.157 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
It might be argued that the results predicted above are not ineluctable. 
Fortunately, hypothesis is not limited by probability. Even so, it is sig-
nificant that at least one post-Congo v. Belgium court has read the case 
precisely this way. In Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor,158 the Spe-
cial Court for Sierra Leone said, “the International Court of Justice [in 
Congo v. Belgium] upheld immunities in national courts even in respect 
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 155. ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 17(2)(a),(c). 
 156. The other ground for invoking the ICC’s jurisdiction—when a state is unable to 
prosecute because of a “total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judi-
cial system”—is obviously inapplicable on these facts. See id. art. 17(3). 
 157. See, e.g., Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 158. Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on 
Immunity from Jurisdiction, para. 50 (May 31, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/ 
SCSL-03-01-I-059.pdf. 
2006] IMMUNITY OR IMPUNITY? 493 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity relying on customary interna-
tional law.”159 
Given this, it cannot be said that the potential for misinterpretation of 
Congo v. Belgium in national tribunals is illusory. This is particularly 
unfortunate since if one accepts the proposition that the states most likely 
not to ratify the ICC treaty are those most likely to engage in conduct it 
prohibits, then it follows that non-party state officials will also be those 
who most frequently commit core crimes. In such cases, the courts in 
their nationality states, where they are most apt to be found, may be mo-
tivated to shield them from prosecution by an international court, which 
they abjure, by applying a rule of immunity based on a colorable reading 
of Congo v. Belgium. 
Moreover, the effects will not be limited to non-parties to the ICC 
Statute. For even in cases involving state parties, the ICC will be pre-
cluded from requesting the surrender of the officials of non-party states 
because, if Congo v. Belgium means that non-party state officials have 
immunity for core crimes, such a request would require the state party 
“to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with 
respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a 
third State . . . .”160 In either situation it is unlikely that the ICC will ever 
be able to assume jurisdiction by invoking the exception to the rule of 
complementarity for a prosecution that lacks “genuineness.” 
Equally unfortunate is the opportunity missed to bring some clarity to 
an underdeveloped area of international law. Instead, in Congo v. Bel-
gium’s wake the status of state official immunity is even more in doubt. 
After more than a half century of erosion in the rule of absolute immu-
nity from prosecution for core international crimes, it appears that state 
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